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The basic thesis of this book is that there is a level of utterance-type meaning,
which is distinct from, and intermediate between, sentence-type meaning and
utterance-token meaning. That is, it is more than encoded linguistic meaning
but generally less than the full interpretation of an utterance. Here are some
examples, where (a) is a sentence and (b) is its utterance-type meaning:
(1) (a) Some of the children passed the test.
(b) Some but not all of the children passed the test.
(2) (a) Mary looked at John and he smiled.
(b) Mary looked at John and then he=John smiled.
(3) (a) Nick was instrumental in lighting the ﬁre.
(b) There was something odd in the way Nick lit the ﬁre.
(4) (a) Can you pass the salt?
(b) I request that you pass the salt.
The highlighted elements in each of the (b) representations are not derived by
linguistic decoding but are pragmatically inferred.
In the Gricean pragmatics tradition, pragmatically inferred meaning is
usually closely associated with context-dependence and with maxims or
principles which are geared to the recovery of the speaker’s intended mean-
ing. However, while Levinson agrees that this is the right way to view the
processes of full interpretation of an utterance token, he takes a quite dif-
ferent stance on the pragmatics of utterance-type meaning, which is a matter
of preferred or default (or ‘presumptive’) interpretations, ‘which are carried
by the structure of utterances, given the structure of the language, and not by
virtue of the particular contexts of utterances’ (1). And while these default
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are ‘based not on direct computations about speaker-intention but rather on
general expectations about how language is normally used’ (22). That is, they
are generated automatically by default usage rules associated with certain
linguistic expressions and structures. So, for instance, the quantitative term
some in (1a) carries a default rule licensing the inference to ‘not all’ and
the conjunction and in (2a) carries a default rule to the eﬀect that the event
described in the ﬁrst conjunct preceded that described in the second con-
junct. Since these are default inferences, hence defeasible, their results
can be overridden, and this is where context does play a role: if the default
output is inconsistent with the context, it is dropped. In the case of (1a),
for instance, if there is a contextual assumption to the eﬀect that all of
the children passed the test then this will defeat the default inference given
in (1b).
Levinson mentions a number of pragmatic phenomena, including illocu-
tionary force (as in (4) above), conversational routines and presuppositions,
which contribute to the level of utterance-type meaning, but the focus of
the book is on a class of conversational implicatures, exempliﬁed in (1b)–(3b)
above. He makes a sharp distinction between these generalized conver-
sational implicatures (GCIs) and conversational implicatures of a particu-
larized sort (PCIs):
(5) A: Did the children’s summer camp go well?
B: Some of them got stomach ’ﬂu.
GCI: Not all of the children got stomach ’ﬂu.
PCI: The summer camp didn’t go as well as hoped.
While the PCI of B’s utterance depends on the context provided by A’s
question and would not arise in a diﬀerent context (e.g. a context in which
the issue is whether all the children were able to sit their exams), the GCI
would arise quite generally across contexts. These two domains of pragmatic
inference work in totally distinct ways: PCIs depend on some (unspeciﬁed)
maxim of relevance which is responsive to particular contextual assump-
tions, while GCIs are underpinned by three informativeness principles (based
roughly on Grice’s quantity and manner maxims), each of which licenses the
hearer to employ a corresponding heuristic:
(6) Q-HEURISTIC: What isn’t said to be the case is not the case.
I-HEURISTIC: What is said in a simple (unmarked) way represents a
stereotypical situation.
M-HEURISTIC: What is said in an abnormal (marked) way represents an
abnormal situation.
The Q-heuristic has to be relativized to a relevant scale of lexical alternates,
e.g.<all,some>for(1)and(5)above.TheI-heuristicandtheM-heuristicare
responsible for the implicatures in (2b) and (3b), respectively. As Levinson
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of the I- and M-principles reﬂecting his ‘division of pragmatic labour’: two
coextensive expressions diﬀering in formal markedness tend to become as-
sociated with complementary subsets of the original extension (e.g. kill and
cause to die).
These, then, are the core ideas explored in the book, which is organized
into a short introduction, four long chapters and a short epilogue. The ﬁrst
big chapter sets out to make the case that GCIs comprise a distinct domain
within pragmatics. It traces the Gricean background within which the dis-
tinction between generalized and particularized conversational implicature
arose and argues that an approach like Relevance Theory (RT; Sperber &
Wilson 1986/1995), which does not give the distinction any theoretical weight
and employs the same communicative principle and comprehension pro-
cedure in the derivation of all conversational implicatures, cannot do justice
to the nature of these generalized inferences. The case for GCIs is given
empirical support by the observation, again from Horn, that languages
do not lexicalize the meanings ‘not all’, ‘not always’, ‘not both’ (as opposed
to ‘none’, ‘never’, ‘nor’). The idea is that this is because each of these
meanings is inferred by default from the words some, sometimes and or,
respectively.
The second chapter explores the three species of GCI in considerable
detail. Levinson provides a wealth of examples of each kind and candidly
acknowledges that some of them raise problems for his account. For
example, the scales at issue in the generation of scalar Q-implicatures may
be context-dependent (e.g. a scale consisting of celebrities ordered in terms
of their popularity) rather than a matter of semantic entailment (as in
the cases of all/some, and/or and the number terms), so that this kind
of Q-inference crosscuts the generalized/particularized distinction. A quite
disparate range of phenomena fall in the class of I-based inferences,
including conjunction buttressing, bridging inferences, some cases of pro-
nominal reference resolution as in (2) above, lexical narrowings, and pos-
sessive interpretations. Several of these can have more than one outcome
and so don’t seem to be cases which have a default/preferred interpretation
after all. The chapter ends with a discussion of the potential conﬂicts
among the three principles and resolves the problem by imposing an order
of priority on them: ﬁrst Q-inferences, then M-inferences and ﬁnally
I-inferences.
The third chapter is, to my mind at least, the most interesting, as it is
here that Levinson confronts the role of pragmatic inference in determining
the truth-conditional content of an utterance. That pragmatics plays this
role is widely acknowledged nowadays by pragmatists across various frame-
works, but it tends still to be resisted by advocates of a truth-conditional
semantics for natural language, as it causes obvious problems for a compo-
sitionality principle conceived in truth-conditional terms and calls into
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doubts that it will ultimately work, Levinson would like to ‘limit the
damage’ with the hypothesis that it is just his chosen domain of pragmatic
inferences, GCIs, that can aﬀect truth conditions. They can do this in a range
of ways, including playing a role in processes of disambiguation and refer-
ence resolution, but most signiﬁcantly, there are certain situations in which
their own content is actually composed into the truth conditions of the
utterance. This occurs in the class of what he calls ‘intrusive’ constructions
(which include negations, conditionals, disjunctions and comparatives). He
calls them intrusive because they have the property that ‘the truth conditions
of the whole expression depend on the implicatures of some of its constituent
parts’ (213–214):
(7) (a) If both teams got three goals the game was a draw.
(b) If both teams got exactly three goals the game was a draw.
(8) (a) It’s better to drive home and drink a bottle of wine than to drink a
bottle of wine and drive home.
(b) It’s better to drive home and then drink a bottle of wine than to drink
a bottle of wine and then drive home.
For (7a), the GCI of the embedded sentence both teams got three goals,
namely ‘at most three goals’, is composed with the encoded semantics
‘at least three goals’ to give the truth conditions in (7b); similarly, mutatis
mutandis, for (8).
Thus, what is a non-truth-conditional element (an implicature) of the
simple sentence becomes part of the truth conditions of the more complex
sentence in which the simple one is embedded. This seems barely coherent
and leads to the prediction that the intuitively valid argument in (9) is in-
valid, since the truth conditions of premise 2 don’t match those of the ante-
cedent of the conditional in premise 1:
(9) Premise 1: If both teams got three goals then the game was a draw.
Premise 2: Both teams got three goals.
Conclusion: The game was a draw.
Relevance theorists, on the other hand, predict the intuitive validity of (9),
since they take the view that utterances of the complex sentences in (7a)
and (8a) AND utterances of the simple sentences on their own are equally
likely to be pragmatically enriched; this is not a matter of implicature in
either case but of pragmatic development of the schematic encoded logi-
cal form of the utterance (see Carston 2004). For a recent bid to save
the traditional semantic picture by limiting the truth-conditional eﬀects
of pragmatics to the saturation of linguistically given variables, see King
& Stanley (2004).
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three Binding Conditions of generative grammar can be reduced to a single
grammatical condition, with the eﬀects of the other two being secured by
default pragmatic inferences of the Q and M variety.
There is no space here for detailed assessment of Levinson’s important
project, which challenges much received thinking. (For a recent thought-
ful critique, see Bezuidenhout 2002.) However, as a relevance theorist,
I am bound to issue the following caveat: readers not well-acquainted
with relevance theory will get a rather skewed view of it from this book.
Levinson repeatedly claims that, since RT is a theory of context-sensitive
inference, it is inherently incapable of accounting for generalized inferences
such as those above – he gives NO argument to substantiate this serious
allegation. He makes other claims about RT: ‘[A]ccording to [Sperber &
Wilson] all inference involved in implicature derivation is deductive, hence
the inferences must be monotonic’ (56); ‘Relevance theorists propose
that there is a special kind of implicature, an explicature, that embellishes
logical forms in limited ways’ (238); ‘Wilson and Sperber … have argued
that pragmatics amounts to nothing more than central reasoning pro-
cesses applied to linguistic stimuli’ (371). The ﬁrst claim here is false, the
second a distortion, and the third, which did appear in an early RT
paper, has long since been superseded (see any RT publication since 1994,
in particular Sperber & Wilson 1995, Carston 2002, Wilson & Sperber
2003).
The issue of whether or not default inferences of the sort that Levinson
proposes are, in fact, carried out in the on-line process of utterance
interpretation is currently one of the main foci of work in the newly-
developing ﬁeld of experimental pragmatics (see, in particular, Bott &
Noveck 2003, Katsos et al. 2003). Bott & Noveck asked adult subjects to
respond with ‘true’ or ‘false’ to utterances of underinformative sentences
such as ‘Some robins are birds’ or ‘Some elephants are mammals’. Sub-
jects who respond on the basis of linguistic meaning alone will say ‘true’
while those who have performed the pragmatic scalar inference, giving
‘some but not all robins are birds’, etc. will say ‘false’. Responses were
given under one of two conditions: (a) with a short time lag (900 milli-
seconds) between presentation of the sentence and subjects’ response, and
(b) with a longer time lag (3 seconds). The point of this was to control for
the amount of processing eﬀort subjects could expend before giving their
response. The default inference account predicts that the inference is drawn
automatically and only subsequently cancelled when checked against con-
text (general knowledge that all robins are birds, etc.), so that one would
expect fewer ‘true’ responses in the short time condition than in the longer
time condition. The reverse is predicted by RT, which does not assume any
automatic default pragmatic inferences: the pragmatically enriched in-
terpretation (prompting the response of ‘false’) should take longer than
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72% of the subjects responded ‘true’ in the short time-lag condition, while
only 56% responded ‘true’ in the longer time-lag condition. This is at
odds with the view that the pragmatic interpretation arises from an auto-
matic default inference which is only subsequently cancelled. The authors
conclude that there is no evidence that some has a default interpretation
of ‘some but not all’. Needless to say, much more empirical testing of
the predictions of diﬀerent pragmatic theories is needed before ﬁnal
judgement is made, but the GCI theorist cannot take heart from the results
so far.
Finally, although much of the material in this book has been around in
some form or other for well over a decade, it is very useful to have it all
collected together in one volume. There are many interesting and provoca-
tive lateral thoughts to be found in the notes to the chapters, and the short
epilogue sets out issues which will be debated in pragmatics for many years
to come.
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